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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a happily married couple, Bob and Cathy, in the prime of their lives and
careers. Due to their desire to provide a loving, financially stable environment for a
child, they have postponed having children until their careers are well established,
and they can provide a secure home for their child. Before they have the opportunity
to start their family, the unthinkable strikes – cancer. Bob is diagnosed with
testicular cancer and told that the required treatment may leave him permanently
sterile. With a strong determination to win this battle against cancer and fulfill their
dream of a family, Bob deposits sperm for later use by Cathy when his health has
returned. Sadly, Bob does not beat the odds and does not survive this deadly disease.
Before dying, Bob expresses his intent for Cathy to move forward with their dream
of a family utilizing assisted reproductive techniques. After careful consideration
and time to overcome her grief, Cathy, who is also rapidly approaching the end of
her fertile years, decides to honor Bob’s intention and have his child. Lena is born
two years after Bob succumbed to cancer. However, Lena may not be recognized as
Bob’s child. How can Cathy and Lena’s rights be protected? Is Bob’s sperm
property that he could legally pass to Cathy? Should Lena be treated for inheritance
137
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or other survivor benefits as Bob’s descendent? Is Lena considered illegitimate?
What are the implications of Bob’s expressed intent (or the contrary)? These are
questions confronting individuals utilizing the technology of today, but dealing with
the laws of yesterday.
Today, reproductive technology allows the postponement of reproduction
through the preservation of sperm (called gametes1) for use at a later time.2
Although this technology has been available and widely used for years, the law has
not kept pace with the technological evolution. A Yale College of Law professor
articulated an important difference between medicine and the law when he said “the
medical profession looks forward, while the legal profession gazes backward.”3
Without legislative action, the courts have been left to deal with the complicated
issues arising from assisted reproduction on a case-by-case4 basis, outside the
confines of the inadequate statutes currently on the books. The questions presented
challenge society’s notions of family, involve religious and moral beliefs, and make
legislation difficult to confront.5 Science is forcing the confrontation of moral,
ethical, political, sociological, psychological and legal concerns.6 The nature of the
discussions has left politicians shying away from adequately developing the
necessary legislation. The legal frameworks that have been developed are confusing,
cross over several Uniform Codes,7 and are not adopted by a majority of states.
As recognized by the Prefatory Note of the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, “Once out, the genie will never return to the bottle”,8 it is
unrealistic to believe that the technology, now widely available, will not be utilized.
In addition, lack of legislative activity is unfair to the innocent children born into this

1

Genetic material used in artificial reproduction can be divided into five types: gametes
(eggs and sperm), zygotes (single-cell, fertilized eggs), preembroys (four-to-eight cell
zygotes), embryos (the state at which cell differentiation develops) and fetuses. James E.
Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interaction Between
Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 746-47 (1998).
This Article will focus only on gametes as additional constitutional and property issues
develop as to when a “person” is viable when the union of the egg and sperm has taken place
in zygotes, preembroys, embryos, and fetuses.
2

Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent’s Eye: Proposed Amendments to the
Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 335
(1994).
3
Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of the New Reproductive
Technologies, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 789, 789 (1984).
4

See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588 (Tenn. 1992).
5

Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Successions and Donations: A Symposium: From Cradle to
Tomb: Estate Planning Considerations of the New Procreation, 57 LA. L. REV 27, 28 (1996).
6
Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 197 (1997).
7

See the Unif. Probate Code, Unif. Parentage Act, and Unif. Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act which are discussed in detail in this Article.
8

Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 1996).
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circumstance. It is time for politicians to step forward into this political hotbed and
make conscious, thoughtful decisions regarding the status of these children.
Bob, and other men, who want a post-mortem connection established with their
children, face many hurdles surrounding posthumous conception. Indeed, a child
conceived after Bob’s death will be considered illegitimate since his death
terminated the marriage leaving Cathy classified as an unmarried woman. A
presumption of paternity only exists if Lena was born within 280 days of Bob’s
death. Most paternity statutes, including Ohio’s, do not contemplate posthumous
conception. Therefore, unless very liberally construed, the current laws will not
allow the child to prove her mother’s prior husband was her legal father for purposes
of intestacy or survivor’s benefits. The current laws present significant obstacles to
the achievement of the recognition of the child as the decedent’s heir.
This Article will argue that the posthumous child and the rights and
responsibilities relating to such a child, are directly related to the fundamental right
to procreate, thus statutes must support rather than prohibit posthumous conception.
It will argue that legislation must necessarily incorporate that right in determining
issues and forming legislation related to the posthumous child. It will show that
current legislation, both the various Uniform Codes and Ohio’s Revised Code, is not
sufficient to protect and provide for this new class of children. In reaching this
conclusion, Part II of this Article will review the history of artificial insemination. It
will then discuss in Part III the details of posthumous reproduction, with a focus on
artificial insemination using sperm from a deceased husband.9 In setting the stage
for legislative perspective, Part IV will discuss the various analytical approaches
which have been used by the courts, in the absence of clear legislation, to determine
the rights associated with posthumous reproduction and the resulting child’s
inheritance rights. Part V considers the development of case law as the issues
surrounding assisted reproduction make their way to the courts for guidance. As
inheritance rights, public policy, and the support of the posthumous child are
important areas of concern, Part VI will consider the implications for inheritance
involving the posthumous child. Finally, this Article will review the current uniform
legislation and Ohio’s adoption, or lack of adoption, of these uniform acts to suggest
changes addressing the realities of the posthumous child which directly confront
issues relating to nonmainstream family situations.
II. HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Artificial insemination has been around for years.10 According to a Talmudic
document back in 22 A.D., a rabbi discussed the hypothetical status of a woman
impregnated by sitting in bath water containing previously deposited sperm.11
9

This Article will focus on the situation where the gamete is sperm (not egg) and the
decedent is the husband of the woman inseminated. See Kristin L. Antall, Note, Who is My
Mother?: Why States Should Ban Posthumous Reproduction by Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX
203 (1999) for detail concerning posthumous artificial insemination using a deceased
woman’s egg and a surrogate. Donor artificial insemination will only be considered when
comparing current legislation and implications for inheritance.
10

WARREN FREEDMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION 23
(1991).
11

Id.
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However, the first intentional act of artificial insemination did not occur until 1322
when warring Arab tribes inseminated their enemy’s mares with inferior stallion’s
sperm.12 In 1770, an English doctor, John Hunter, recorded the first successful
human artificial insemination.13 Dr. Hunter continued and furthered the practice of
artificial insemination through 1799.14 The United States, possibly hesitant to
expand beyond coital reproduction, did not adopt the practice of artificial
insemination until 1866.15 Even then, it was not considered praise worthy, but rather
disdained.16 Also in 1866, an Italian scientist, Montegazza, discovered that sperm
could survive being frozen and recommended that frozen sperm banks hold sperm in
case the widows of men killed at war would want to be inseminated.17 The process
was not very successful until it was discovered in 1949 that adding a small amount of
glycerol before freezing increased the sperm survival rate.18 Currently, sperm which
has been stored using glycerol has been used over ten years later to produce healthy
children.19
Three delineations of sperm types are used for insemination depending upon the
status of the sperm donor and his relationship to the female recipient.20 The seminal
fluid can be drawn from the following sources: (1) artificial insemination donor or
artificial insemination heterologous (AID), which involves the sperm being donated
by a third person or donor; (2) artificial insemination homologous (AIH), which is
the sperm donated by the husband; and (3) combined artificial insemination (CAI),
which involves the sperm of the donor and the sperm of the husband being mixed
together.21 AID has been widely used and is addressed in the Uniform Parentage
Act.22
AIH, which is the focus of this Article, involves a simple medical procedure
whereby a woman is inseminated during ovulation using a syringe containing her
husband’s semen which he deposited before he became infertile.23 For example, AIH
was made available to the astronauts in 1961 in the event space travel harmed their

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15
John A. Gibbons, Comment, Who’s Your Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis of PostMortem Insemination, 14 J. CONTEMP. H.L. & POL’Y 187, 189 (1997).
16

E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of
Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986).
17

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 234.

18

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 234.

19

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 234.

20

FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 24.

21

FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 24.

22

The Unif. Parentage Act § 5 9B U.L.A. 287, is discussed in the Uniform Code and Ohio
Law section.
23

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 238.
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reproductive system.24 Using AIH, they could still father healthy children after
returning from space.25 Also, this form of reproductive technology offers an option
for men facing medical treatment that could make them sterile such as radiation or
chemotherapy.26
AIH typically would present few legal challenges since the resulting child is the
biological offspring of the genetic contributors.27 However, issues arise when the
husband is deceased and the wife wants to use the gamete to produce offspring on
her own. When these men die, the fate of their frozen sperm must be decided.
Should it be destroyed? Who should receive the sperm? Can it be used to produce
offspring? These are questions that will be explored further in this Article.
III. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
The law has long recognized posthumous births as the birth of a child after the
death of a husband or male partner.28 However, these well-accepted posthumous
births involved the death occurring during gestation, but after conception.29 Since
the husband or male partner died from illness, accident, war, or as an “act of fate,”
few ethical or legal issues were raised except those questioning the prudence of
starting a family if the death was reasonably anticipated.30 From an inheritance
perspective, these children have long been recognized as afterborn children.31
Generally, these children have been included as heir’s relatives born after the
decedent if they are born alive within ten months (normal period of gestation) after
the decedent’s death.32 These children have not challenged our traditional concepts
of family or other ethical issues. Indeed, these children are typically viewed with
sympathy and support from their community and governmental resources such as
social security. Again, issues arise when the wife makes the decision to conceive
after the death of her husband.
Posthumous conception refers to the conception of a child after the death of one
or both of the biological parents. The posthumously conceived child cannot take
advantage of the marital presumption of filiation with a deceased parent because the

24

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 238.

25

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 238.

26

John A. Robertson, Symposium: Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics: Posthumous
Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1035 (1994).
27

Guzman, supra note 6.

28

American Society for Reproductive Medicine <http:\\\www.asrm.org> (visited
December 23, 1999).
29

Id.

30

Id.

31

See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 and OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.34 reviewed in detail in
the Uniform Law and Ohio Law section of this Article.
32

ROGER W. ANDERSEN, ET. AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 49 (1996).
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husband’s death terminates the marital relationship with the wife.33 To be classified
as an after-born child, a child must have been conceived prior to the death of the
husband in order to take from the husband’s estate.34 Therefore, the posthumously
conceived child may be considered illegitimate based on the timing of conception
occurring after the death of the husband. The nature of posthumous conception faces
a large gap in our legal framework.35 Our legal system simply did not contemplate
someone desiring or having the ability to conceive a child once they were deceased.36
One of the first legal questions raised concerns whether the law should sanction the
propriety of transferring gametes.37 Another legal question is whether the law should
recognize the use of the donor’s sperm for conception of a child whom the donor
intends to be viewed as his child.38 These questions have lead to extensive
discussions regarding the nature of gametes as property and the constitutional rights
to procreate.39
IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
A. Property Rights
With the lack of legislative direction for posthumous conception issues, the
courts have been left to grapple with how to address issues which arise surrounding
gametes. One of the fundamental issues which has arisen is how to handle gametes
once the provider is deceased. Integral to this discussion is the categorization of the
sperm. Should it be considered property and inheritable?40 Another option is to
qualify the sperm as an “interim category that entitles it to special respect because of
its potential for human life”?41 What about classification as human biological
material, such as organs, that has no ownership rights?42 If gametes are property,
what bundle of rights come with them?

33

Gloria Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security
Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 335
(1999).
34
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 discussed in the
Uniform Law and Ohio law section of this Article.
35

Banks, supra note 33, at 264.

36

Banks, supra note 33, at 264.

37

Lorio, supra note 5, at 37.

38

Lorio, supra note 5, at 37.

39

Additional legal and ethical issues are raised when requests are made to harvest sperm
from a dead man. This Article will not venture into the ethical issues this raised when there
has been no indication of intent to contemplate a posthumous child nor sperm already stored.
This Article will focus on the familial setting where the decedent has already stored his sperm
for later use.
40

Sheri Gilbert, Note: Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem
Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 547 (1993).
41

Id.

42

Id.
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Some commentators state without hesitation that gametes are “property” because
they physically exist.43 As part of the bundle of rights contained within property, it
logically follows that gametes are also owned since someone has them in their
possession, or has the authority to decide what to do with them.44 However, in the
most widely cited case regarding property interest in body tissue, Moore v. Regents
of the University of California,45 the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
did not retain a property interest in tissue which had been removed from his body.
Although the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not sustain a
case for conversion, it did hold that the researcher must obtain informed consent
before removing cells.46 The court’s discussion revolving around Moore’s potential
ownership in removed tissue implies naturally that Moore had a property interest
before it was removed.47 Presumably the court rejected Moore’s claim of conversion
because removed parts are usually destroyed.48 Therefore since gametes are not
destroyed when removed, and are very important to the individual that deposits
them, a property interest in gametes deductively follows.49
“The approach adopted by existing case law50 on the subject, as well as by the
American Fertility Society, is to view sperm as a unique kind of property because of
its potential for human life.”51 However, none of the current statutes delineate who
owns the sperm when it is deposited.52 Common practice by sperm banks, which
also implies ownership in the sperm, is to have the donor sign a waiver of any further
rights to the sperm including any future action of paternity.53 In exchange for
waiving their property interest in their sperm, they are contractually promised
anonymity from any woman who may utilize their sperm to be impregnated.54 The
sperm bank policy differs when a man has deposited the sperm for his own personal
future use.55 In these circumstances, the man owns his sperm and is required to pay a
fee for maintenance and later release.56 The sperm agreements, as contractual
43

Bailey, supra note 1, at 758.

44

Bailey, supra note 1, at 758.

45

793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).

46

Id.

47

Bailey, supra note 1, at 759.

48

Robertson, supra note 26, at 1038.

49

Robertson, supra note 26, at 1038.

50

Both the French case Parpalaix v. CECOS and Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275 (1993) were decided based on property law. The holdings of these cases will be explored
in further detail as this Article evaluates the case law developments in assisted reproduction.
51

Gilbert, supra note 40, at 547.

52

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.

53

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.

54

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.

55

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.

56

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.
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agreements, typically require the depositor to express his intent for the sperm in case
of death.57 Absent this expressed intent, or a court order obtained by the widow or
significant other, the sperm will be destroyed when the sperm bank is notified of the
depositor’s death.58 However, numerous Ohio cases59 have upheld that heirs do hold
property rights in the deceased’s body. This precedent could be used to argue that
heirs have property rights to gametes even without the express consent of the
husband.
Considering semen as property also brings the presumption that any directions
for posthumous distribution should be honored.60 As a matter of property or
inheritance law, the husband should be able to pass along his property to his wife.61
However, we must first consider any constitutional state restrictions that may
implicate the use or bequeathing of gametes even considering them as property.62
B. Constitutional Right to Procreate
Before proceeding to determine what legislation is appropriate involving
posthumous children, it is important to determine whether procreation by artificial
insemination is considered a fundamental right. Once the Supreme Court determines
that a right is a fundamental right, a strict scrutiny test will be applied to any state
regulation implemented.63 To pass a strict scrutiny test, a state must show that they
have a compelling interest in the regulation and there is no less burdensome means
of protecting that interest. To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
issue of posthumous conception, however it has addressed the constitutional right to
procreate through a series of cases.
The first case addressed by the Supreme Court was Buck v. Bell64 which involved
the sterilization of a feeble-minded individual. The Court was asked to determine
the constitutionality of a statute allowing the sterilization of mental defectives.65 Ms.
Buck was the feeble-minded daughter of a feeble-minded mother who had a feeble57

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.

58

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 243.

59

See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F. 2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that a decision
as to whether a widow had a “property interest” in her husband’s corneas was unnecessary,
because “the aggregate of rights granted by the state of Ohio to Deborah Brotherton rises to
the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ in Steven Brotherton’s body…protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). See also Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d
547 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding family members have a right to the body for purposes of
preparation, mourning, and burial; however, they may not have the right to refuse an autopsy
if the person died in an unusual manner); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d
430 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding the descendants of decent have a course of action when
remains are disturbed).
60

Robertson, supra note 26, at 1039.

61

Robertson, supra note 26, at 1039.

62

Id.

63

Antall, supra note 9, at 221.

64

274 U.S. 200 (1927).

65

Id. at 205.
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145

In a short opinion, the Court deemed the law

[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.67
Overturning Buck years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma,68 the Supreme Court
viewed procreation as “one of the basic civil rights of man,” and stated that
“marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.”69 The question presented to the court involved the Oklahoma Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act.70 The Act allowed a habitual criminal to be sterilized.71
A habitual criminal was defined as “a person who, having been convicted two or
more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude’ either in an
Oklahoma court or in a court of any other State, is thereafter convicted of such a
felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma
penal institution.”72 The Court found this act unconstitutional on Equal Protection
grounds.73 The Skinner Court set the tone for the Court to rely on the right to
privacy as the basis for finding unconstitutional laws that interfered with an
individual’s decisions concerning childbearing.74
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute criminalizing
the distribution of contraceptives.75 Here, the Court found the statute unconstitutional recognizing a fundamental right to privacy for married individuals.76 In
articulating its decision, Justice Douglas determined that “the specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.”77 The Court determined that because the right to
privacy is comprised of “emanations” from several fundamental constitutional
guarantees, any relationship lying within this zone of privacy must be afforded the

66

Id.

67

Id. at 207.

68

316 U.S. 535 (1942).

69

Id. at 541.

70

Id. at 536.

71

Id. at 537.

72

Id. at 536.

73

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.

74

Gilbert, supra note 40, at 532.

75

381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).

76

Id.

77

Id. at 484.
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same protection as that given to the central rights explicitly provided for in the Bill
of Rights.78
The Supreme Court extended the right to privacy to include the individual’s, not
just the married couple’s, right to privacy in making procreative decisions in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.79 Here, the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute80
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults.81 The Eisenstadt
Court demonstrated the significance of the right to make procreative decisions by
holding that the right is so fundamental that it is not reserved for a certain class of
individuals, but rather resides within the constitutional protections available to all
individuals.82 In his opinion, Justice Brennan stated “it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child.”83
Combining the decisions of Griswold and Eisenstadt in Carey v. Population
Services,84 the Court clearly recognized the right of the individual to make
procreative choices as fundamental.85 Here, the Court found unconstitutional a New
York statute which prohibited distribution of contraceptives to anyone under age
sixteen as well as prohibiting distribution to anyone over sixteen by anyone other
than a licensed pharmacist.86 Reviewing the prior cases, the Court stated, “the
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters
of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”87
Considered together, the Court showed in Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt and
Carey that there exists a fundamental right of the individual, whether married or
single,88 to make procreative choices.89 This was articulated in Carey when the Court
78

Id. at 485.

79

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

80

The statute being reviewed read as follows: “Whoever . . . gives away . . . any drug,
medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception,” except as
authorized in 21A, “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than
. . . two and one half years or by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one
thousand dollars.” Under 21A, “[a] registered physician may administer to or prescribe for
any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception.”
81

Id. at 454-55.

82

Id. at 453.

83

Id.

84

431 U.S. 678 (1977).

85

Id.

86

Id.

87
Id. at 687. The Court clarified that the test for determining whether state restrictions that
inhibit the privacy rights of minors are valid is whether or not they serve “any significant state
interest . . . that is not present in the case of an adult.” Id. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)). The Court found that although the states
have more latitude to regulate the conduct of children, there was no significant state interest
involved here. Id.
88
See, e.g., Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood From the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem
Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV 521, 534 (1993). Although this Article is specifically
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stated, “where a decision . . . to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations
imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must
be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”90 Through these cases, the Court
dealt with situations where technology was used to prevent the conception of a child.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the privacy protections afford
individuals the right to use technology to conceive even though lower courts have
been presented with this issue.91 However, Carey can be interpreted to extend the
right to use reproductive technologies to conceive.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never confronted the use of
assisted reproduction as a fundamental right, at least one district court has done so.92
In Lifchez v. Hartigan93 the Northern District of Illinois held unconstitutional an
Illinois abortion law94 which prohibited the sale of or experimentation upon a human
fetus unless such experimentation was “therapeutic” to the fetus.95 In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the court found a violation of a woman’s fundamental right
to privacy, “in particular, her right to make reproductive choices free of
governmental interference with those choices.”96
In further expanding the
boundaries of the right to privacy and the right to use noncoital (nonintercourse)
methods to procreate, the court stated: “It takes no great leap of logic to see that
within the cluster of constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have
access to contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to
submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent,
pregnancy.”97

addressing the situation where the sperm recipient was married to the decedent, for a detailed
discussion concerning implications of the Court’s holding in Eisenstadt concerning unmarried
women.
89

Gilbert, supra note 40, at 534.

90

Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.

91

Gibbons, supra note 15, at 198.

92

Gilbert, supra note 40, at 536.

93

735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

94

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 510/6(7) (West 2000) (originally cited as 38 ILL. REV.
STAT. § 1-26 (West 1989) (providing “quote statute.”)
No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertilization of a
human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus
thereby produced. Intentional violation of this section is a Class A demeanor.
Nothing in this subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro
fertilization.
95

735 F. Supp. at 1362.

96

Id. at 1376.

97

Id. at 1377.
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C. Ability to Bequeath Gametes
Assuming the constitutional right to procreate,98 the issue of bequeathing the
gametes takes center stage. Passing property at death has been part of the AngloAmerican culture since feudal times and is valuable to piece of mind.99 While the
authority of the state and federal governments to control the laws of testamentary
disposition and inheritance is clear, the United States Supreme Court in Hodel v.
Irving observed that, “in one form or another, the right to pass on property…has
been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times . . . Even the
United States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional.”100 In Hodel, the Court declared
unconstitutional a statute101 that restricted the right of owners of fractional interests
in Indian Land to give that land by will or intestacy.102 The Court stated that to limit
the descent of the fractional property interests by intestacy or to regulate the number
of beneficiaries, a testator could designate to receive the land, but a state could not
abolish both the right of descent and devise.103 Essentially, Hodel’s holding indicates
that a state may be able to regulate the types of property that can pass by intestate
succession, but no state can prevent the bequeathing of one’s property.104
Applying our previous discussion concerning gametes as “property,” it thus
follows that one should have the decision-making authority over one’s gametes, and
the right to give this “property” at death.105 Indeed, the current case law has
developed around the premise that gametes are property. This concept has been
integral to the various lower courts’ analysis in the developing case law on assisted
reproduction technology.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
Although the courts in Ohio have not yet been challenged to directly decide the
fate of gametes or embryos, activity throughout the world and other U.S.
jurisdictions indicate that it is only a matter of time before every state will have to
98

See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L. J. 1027 (1994) for an
extensive analysis of extending the constitutional right to procreate posthumously to the
decedent. Compares posthumous reproductive directives to medical directives such as a living
will. Also, at stake are the fundamental rights of procreation for the surviving spouse to
reproduce utilizing her sperm of choice.
99

Djalleta, supra note 2, at 341.

100

481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).

101

The statute was enacted in response to succeeding generations of Sioux who had
divided up their predecessors’ tracts into tiny fractional interests for which the government
paid pennies of rent per year. The Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 provided that any
undivided fractional interest which represented less than 2% of a tract’s acreage, and which
had earned less than $100 in the preceding year would escheat to the tribe rather than descend
by intestacy or devise. Djalleta, supra note 2, at 341.
102

Djalleta, supra note 2, at 341.

103

Djalleta, supra note 2, at 341.

104

Djalleta, supra note 2, at 341.

105

Djalleta, supra note 2, at 356.
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face the legal ramifications of assisted reproduction.106 The court systems have been
left to unravel cases of first impression, and to use property, contract and
constitutional implications to determine each outcome on a case-by-case basis. A
number of the challenges presented are discussed below as the winding road of
reproductive advancements attempts to cross the legal chasm.
The first legal warning to the impending issues of assisted reproduction was
sounded in Melbourne, Australia in 1983.107 This case involved a married couple,
Mario and Elsa Rios, who were both killed in a plane crash during a time that they
were participating in a frozen embryo artificial insemination program.108 Since
neither parent’s will mentioned their two frozen embryos, the embryos were left in a
legal “grey” area109 that Australian law was not prepared to handle.110 In an effort to
establish an acceptable precedent, the State of Victoria established a committee to
decide what to do with the embroyos.111 After review, the committee recommended
destroying the embryos since the parent’s intent for any posthumous use of the
embryos was not expressed.112 After this decision was meet with hostility from the
Australian right-to-life movement and the Catholic Church, the Victoria legislature
was challenged with the task of determining the fate of the embryos.113 The
legislature rejected the committee’s recommendations, and determined that the
embryos could be implanted in a surrogate.114 However, the Attorney General of the
State of Victoria stripped the embroyos of any legal status, thus disallowing any
inheritance from the estate.115 Although this case arose over fifteen years ago, the
warning sound for legislative action has not yet been heeded.
In 1984, another international case won headlines as the French Tribunal decided
Parpalaix v. CECOS.116 Similar to our introductory situation, Alain Parpalaix, a
citizen of France, was diagnosed with testicular cancer at the age of twenty-four.117

106

Massachusetts is now another state faced with deciding how to handle frozen embryos.
See Carey Goldberg, Massachusetts Case is Latest to Ask Court to Decide Fate of Frozen
Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A20. According to the article, cases involving divorce
and frozen embryos have arisen in Illinois, Michigan, Texas, Alabama and New Jersey in the
last year.
107
Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to be Born? Legislative Inaction and the
Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 1007 (1996).
108

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1007-08.

109

Hoping to share in the couple’s estate, approximately ninety women volunteered to be
impregnated with the “orphaned” embryos. Id. at 1008.
110

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1008.

111

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1008.

112

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1008.

113

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1008.

114

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1008.

115

Mika & Hurst, supra note 107, at 1008.

116

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 229.

117

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 229.
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After being told that the recommended chemotherapy would leave him sterile, he
deposited his sperm in a government run sperm bank in Paris.118 Unfortunately,
Alain’s intent for the frozen sperm in the event of his death was not made clear at the
time of his deposit.119 Complicating matters, at the time of his deposit, Alain was
living with Corinne Richard but the two were not married.120 However, as Alain’s
condition deteriorated, Alain and Corinne were married in a hospital ceremony just
two days before his death.121
When Corinne’s request to secure Alain’s sperm for her use in artificial
insemination was denied, a legal battle of first impression was set into motion.
Corinne and her in-laws claimed they were Alain’s natural heirs who had become the
owners of the sperm, and were entitled to the sperm under contract law.122 In
addition to a contract law argument, Corinne and her in-laws argued that Alain’s
intent, although not expressly written, was for Corinne to use the sperm to conceive
his child after his death.123
Alternatively, CECOS argued they did not have any obligations to Corinne as
their agreement was with Alain as the donor.124 They also argued that the sperm was
not divisible from the body, absent express instructions, and therefore is not
inheritable.125 Following from this argument, CECOS contended since Corinne and
Alain were not married at the time of the deposit, and Alain did not provide any
written directives, the sperm should not be given to Corinne.126 CECOS’s final
argument stated that the reason for Alain’s deposit was for therapeutic purposes to
aid Alain psychologically.127
Although the court acknowledged the difficulties presented by this case and the
country’s outdated laws, it did not apply the simple solution of contract principles.128
Instead, the court found that human sperm could not be considered movable and
inheritable property within the meaning of the French Civil Code, and was therefore

118

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 229.

119

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 229.

120

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 230.

121

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 230.

122

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 230. As support for their argument, they
relied on Article 1939 of the French Civil Code, which governed contracts of deposit of
material goods in general and provided, “In the case of death of the person who made the
bailment, the thing bailed may be returned only to his heir. . . . If the thing bailed is
indivisible, the heirs must agree among themselves in order to receive it.” Under this view,
the sperm was to be considered a movable object or property and therefore could be inherited.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 229.
123

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 231.

124

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 231.
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Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 231.
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Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 231.
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Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 231.
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Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 232.
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inapplicable.129 Alain’s intent was the determining factor for the court.130 In the
absence of Alain’s written intent, the court found that Corinne and Alain’s parents
were in the best position to articulate his intentions for the frozen sperm.131 Thus, the
Tribunal ordered CECOS to return the sperm to Corinne.132 Unfortunately, due to
the small quantity and poor quality of the sperm, Corinne was not successful in her
desire to bear Alain’s son posthumously.133 Even though a posthumous child did not
result from this legal battle, it was the first implication of the procreative rights of
those left behind after the death of a loved one.
One of the first cases to determine how the United States would define what
gametes or embryos are was Davis v. Davis.134 In this 1992 case, the initial action
was for divorce and the frozen embryos became an issue.135 The wife originally
wanted the frozen embryos to have them implanted in a post-divorce effort to
become pregnant.136 The husband was adamantly opposed to becoming a parent
under these circumstances and preferred to have the embryos discarded.137 One of
the first things the court noted was the absence of two critical factors:
When the Davises signed up for the IVF program . . . they did not execute
a written agreement specifying what disposition should be made of any
unused embryos that might result from the cryopreservation process.
Moreover, there was at that time no Tennessee statute governing such
disposition, nor has one been enacted in the meantime.138
Thus, the Davis court correctly identified two important criteria needed for the future
of litigation in this area: expressed intent and legislation!
In their holding in favor of the ex-husband, the court implied that the use of in
vitro fertilization is protected under the right to procreate.139 The court noted that “a
person’s liberty to procreate or to avoid procreation is directly involved in most
decisions involving preembryos.”140 “It is further evident that, however far the
protection of procreative autonomy extends, the existence of the right itself dictates
that decisional authority rests in the gamete-providers alone, at least to the extent that
their decisions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status.”141
129

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 232.

130

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 232.

131

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 232.

132

Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 233.
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Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 16, at 233.
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842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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Id.
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Id. at 589.
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Id.
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Id. at 590.
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Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.

140

Id. at 597.
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Id. at 602.
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It was not until 1993 that the United States judicial system was faced with its first
legal challenge of bequeathing frozen sperm and posthumous conception in the
widely cited case of Hecht v. Superior Court.142 In Hecht, the California Court of
Appeal considered a decedent’s right to give gametes at death and the rights of a
post-mortem child to inherit.143 The Court of Appeal was confronting a case of first
impression concerning a trial court’s order to destroy sperm left by a decedent in a
sperm bank.
The facts of the case are detailed as William E. Kane, the decedent, took great
care in ensuring his intent was explicit prior to committing suicide. At the time Kane
committed suicide, he was living with long-term girlfriend Deborah E. Hecht.144 He
was also survived by two college-age children from a previous marriage.145 Prior to
committing suicide, Kane deposited sperm at a sperm bank, signing an agreement
providing in pertinent part that “[i]n the event of the death of the client, . . . the client
instructs the Cryobank to . . . continue to store [the specimens] upon request of the
executor of the estate [or] release the specimens to the executor of the estate.”146
Another provision also states, “I, William Everett Kane, . . . authorize the sperm
bank to release my semen specimens (vials) to Deborah Ellen Hecht. I am also
authorizing specimens to be released to recipient’s physician Dr. Kathryn Moyer.”147
Kane had also executed a will which was filed with the Los Angeles County
Superior Court and admitted to probate.148 The will named Hecht as executor of the
estate, and provided, “I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any
specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to
Deborah Ellen Hecht.”149 In another example of Kane’s clear intention, he had left a
letter addressed to his children which stated,
I address this to my children, because, although I have only two, Everett
and Katy, it may be that Deborah will decide – as I hope she will – to
have a child by me after my death. . . . If she does, then this letter is for
my posthumous offspring, as well, with the thought that I have loved you
in my dreams, even though I never got to see you born.150
After numerous attempts to settle the will, both of Kane’s children filed separate
will contests.151 The children also argued that Moore v. Regents of University of

142

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).

143

Id.
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Id. at 276.
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Id.
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Id.
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Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 277.

151

Id. The children asserted that the will was invalid because Kane was under the undue
influence of Hecht and because he lacked testamentary capacity.
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California152 should control. The Hecht court distinguished Moore, stating in Hecht,
Kane expected to retain control over his sperm after he gave it to the sperm bank
where in Moore, the patient did not desire control over the tissue, but rather
money.153 The court also noted the position of the American Fertility Society that
“gametes and preembryos are the property of the donors and the donors therefore
have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these items,
provided such disposition is within medical and ethical guidelines.”154
The California Court of Appeal held that at the time of his death, a decedent had
a “property” interest in his frozen sperm, stating he had “an interest, in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that he had decision-making authority as to the use of his
sperm for reproduction.”155 The court also held that allowing insemination of an
unmarried woman, specifically posthumous insemination, was not against public
policy.156 The court issued a writ that prohibited destruction of the frozen sperm of
the decedent, William E. Kane, and vacated the lower court’s order to destroy the
sperm.157 Thus, the Hecht court firmly established the precedent of gametes as
property, and the ability to bequeath sperm for posthumous use, at least where the
intent of the grantor is explicit.
In 1998, New York was the next state to be confronted with the issue of what to
do with embryos as part of a divorce action in Kass v. Kass.158 In this case, the wife
wanted the ability to implant the five frozen pre-embryos that her and her former
husband had created.159 The husband did not want to accept the parenting
responsibilities, and claimed that the parties agreed at the time they started the
process that in the event of divorce, the pre-embryos should be donated to the IVF
program for approved research purposes.160 What distinguishes this case from
Davis161 is that the Kasses had signed a written agreement indicating their intent in a
divorce situation. Here, the court recognized this written document concluding
[t]hat disposition of these pre-zygotes does not implicate a woman’s right
of privacy or bodily integrity in the area of reproductive choice; nor are

152

Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).

153

Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281.

154

Id. at 282.

155
Id. at 283. This interest was sufficient to constitute “property” for purposes of the
California Probate Code, and therefore the court had jurisdiction to determine its disposition.
Id. at 281. The California Probate Code defines property as: “anything that may be the
subject of ownership and includes both real and personal property and any interest therein.”
Cal. Prob. Code 62 (West 1993). This is virtually identical to Unif. Probate Code 1-201 (39)
(1991).
156

Id. at 286, 289.

157

Id. at 291.

158

696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).

159

Id. at 175.

160
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Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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the pre-zygotes recognized as “persons” for constitutional purposes. . . .
The relevant inquiry thus becomes who has dispositional authority over
them. . . . Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding
disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid and
binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.162
Again, the precedent to follow the expressed intent of the participants is confirmed.
Another case establishing the jurisprudence of frozen sperm is Hall v. Fertility
Institute of New Orleans.163 In Hall, following a cancer diagnosis, Barry Hall
deposited fifteen vials of sperm with a fertility institute, and executed a formal Act of
Donation by which he sought to convey his interest in the vials to his girlfriend, St.
John.164 After his death, his executor requested the semen’s transfer to Hall’s son or
its destruction, noting the son’s “extreme emotional upset, embarrassment and
anger…at the prospect of posthumous creation of blood relatives.”165 The executor
also argued that the transfer of sperm opposed public policy and morals.166 St. John
intervened, alleging that she owned the semen through Hall’s donation.167
Although it affirmed a decision prohibiting St. John’s immediate possession of
the sperm, the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected the executor’s argument that a gift
of frozen sperm contravened public policy.168 The court also rejected the argument
that the sperm’s posthumous use would oppose public morals.169 It held that if the
facts at trial show that at the time of the gift the decedent was competent and not
under undue influence, the frozen semen was St. John’s property, and she had full
rights to its disposition.170 Thus, the court found that the relevant inquiry was Hall’s
intent and not society’s moral regard for the disposition of sperm.
Another gap created by the lack of legislative response was identified by Nancy
Young Hart as she applied for social security benefits for her baby girl named Judith
Christine Hart.171 The Social Security Act provides survivor benefits for an insured
decedent’s marital children and nonmarital children if they would take as heirs under
the state’s inheritance law, the decedent had been the child’s regular source of
support, or the decedent had openly acknowledged the child.172 The issue for Judith
Hart involved a Louisiana law which did not determine whether a posthumously
162

Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-80 (N.Y. 1998).

163

647 So.2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994).

164

Id. at 1349-50.

165

Id. at 1350.
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Id. at 1351.
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Hall, 647 So.2d at 1351.
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Id.
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Id.

171
Banks, supra note 33, at 251. Although beyond the scope of this Article, Banks
completes a detailed analysis of the implications of posthumous births for social security and
recommended changes to the social security rules.
172

See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)-(3)(C) (1994).
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conceived child born to a decedent’s widow of the decedent’s frozen sperm was
entitled to social security survivor benefits as the decedent’s child.
Although a legal battle ensued, the court did not have the opportunity to rule on
the case. In a statement before the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, Social Security Commissioner Shirley S. Chater announced
Judith Hart would receive survivor’s benefits if the case was returned from the court
to the Social Security Administration.173 Ms. Chater indicated in her formal appeal
that the public policy issues being raised were more appropriately settled by the
executive and legislative branches rather than the courts.174 Ms. Chater made this
plea on March 11, 1996, and to date the legislative branch has not responded with
adequate statutes.
Turning to Ohio law, Ohio courts have had to deal with issues of artificial
insemination and surrogacy. In C.O. v. W.S., a lesbian couple wanted to have a child
and obtained sperm from a donor they knew.175 The donor was to be a male role
model for the child but a dispute arose about what parental rights the donor should
have.176 He filed a complaint to determine paternity, custody, support and
visitation.177 The applicable Ohio statute read:
If a woman is the subject of a non-spousal artificial insemination, the
donor shall not be treated in law or regarded as the natural father of a
child conceived as a result of the artificial insemination, and a child so
conceived shall not be treated in law or regarded as the natural child of the
donor.178
The court felt the statute was designed to provide anonymity and protection to
both the donor and the mother.179 However by using a known donor, this single
mother “negated her attempts to cloak her pregnancy under the ambit of the
nonspousal artificial insemination law.”180 The court said that if a woman solicits the
participation of a donor and agrees that the donor will have a relationship with the
child, such statutes do not apply.181 Even if the statute did apply, its application
would be unconstitutional (presumably under the equal protection clause) in these
circumstances. “Public policy supports the concept of legitimacy, and the
concomitant rights of a child to support and inheritance. A father’s voluntary
assumption of fiscal responsibility for his child should be endorsed as a socially
responsible action.”182
173

Banks, supra note 33, at 255-56.
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Banks, supra note 33, at 256.
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639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio C.P. 1994).
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Id. at 524.
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Although involving a surrogacy dispute, another case is making its way through
the Ohio Courts which may further raise the assisted reproduction laws issue.183 In
addition to making its way through the courts, this case has brought media attention
as a case of first impression which highlights the inadequacy of the current laws.184
This case involves two married couples who signed a written agreement whereby
Laura J. Cornelius agreed to be a surrogate for the Turchyns.185 It was agreed that
Mrs. Cornelius would be inseminated with Mr. Turchyn’s sperm by means of a
procedure conducted at one of the party’s homes.186 In addition, the agreement
provided that Mrs. Cornelius could change her mind about giving up the baby as
long as she did this prior to the birth of the child.187 Prior to the birth of the child, the
Cornelius’ decided to keep the child and informed the Turchyns of their decision.188
Currently, the Turchyns have requested that the court order genetic testing to
determine whether he could establish a parent/child relationship.189 Unfortunately,
Ohio statutes do not address this situation and the court will be left to interpret other
statutes to determine the outcome of this case.
VI. INHERITANCE AND THE POSTHUMOUS CHILD
As previously addressed, precedent has demonstrated that the right to bequeath
sperm as property would probably be supported if challenged at the Supreme Court
level. In addition, the fundamental right of the female to use the sperm for
procreation should also survive attack at the Supreme Court level. It is now time to
turn to what happens to a child conceived and born posthumously from an estate
planning and inheritance perspective. In the cases previously discussed, the court
frequently focused on the intent of the grantor, whether expressed or implied.
Executing the grantor’s intent, a fundamental basis of probate, must always remain
in the forefront of any discussion of inheritance rights. We will explore the
implications of the current laws in providing for the support of a posthumous child.
A. Testate Succession
In testate succession, the grantor has designated through a will, trust or
combination of both what property will be transferred and to whom. Courts do not
typically interfere with the grantor’s intent for beneficiaries, and will enforce
testamentary dispositions unless they are contrary to public policy or law.190 In

183

Turchyn v. Cornelius, No. 98 C.A. 86, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4129, (Ohio Ct. App.

1999).
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See Brian E. Albrecht, Couple Battle With Surrogate Who Kept Child, PLAIN DEALER,
Jan. 16, 2000, at 1-A.
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addition, a child does not have to be in existence at the time of the testator’s death.191
Many wills concerning prospective children and descendants involve a trust as a
testamentary or inter vivos method of handling estate assets.192 “The best view
appears to be that such trusts are valid for a child conceived postmortem if the trust
also has as a beneficiary some other person already born.”193 As seen in Hecht,194 the
courts have deferred to the intent of the decedent in determining how to handle
frozen gametes.
This appears to be the easy case for the courts to decide: the deceased husband
has made very explicit his intent to pass on his frozen gametes for posthumous use
and has explicitly provided for the financial support of a “potential” posthumous
child through his personal estate planning. The intent of the decedent195 can be
shown in a number of ways including instructions at a sperm bank, through a will, or
trust, but this intent should be honored if expressed. In addition, a serious and
specific oral statement indicating the desire to allow posthumous conception should
be sufficient.196 Requiring a written statement may be unduly burdensome for some
who do not have the economic backing for legal consultation.197 As the definition of
family changes, the law should not limit testamentary transfers to the spouse of a
deceased male.198 The decedent’s wish to procreate with a specific person should
prevail, particularly if his intent is explicitly demonstrated.
Of concern in this circumstance is the time allocated to settle probate and respond
to the state’s desire to have timely settlement of estate taxes and disposition of
191

Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem Conception,
Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967, 982 (1996).
192

Chester, supra note 191, at 984.

193

Chester, supra note 191, at 984.

194

Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).

195

For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the decedent deposited the sperm
prior to his death. A whole different area of concern can arise when a family member requests
the harvesting of gametes from a dead body. See, e.g., Ivor Davis, Posterity Insurance, AIDS,
Infertility and Medical Advances Have Given Sperm Banks a Run on Their Frozen Assets, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 26, at 5-1 (discussing case in which a 15-year-old Los Angeles youth’s sperm was
extracted at his family’s request as he lay in a coma after being shot in a gang-related
incident); Ike Flores, Newlywed Dies in Crash, But Hopes for Children Live in Extracted
Sperm, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at A10 (reporting sperm extraction procedure performed on
22-year-old Emanuele Maresca at his widow’s request, after he was killed in a car accident 16
days after their marriage); Maggie Gallagher, The Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1,
1995, at A28 (discussing sperm extraction from the body of 29-year-old Anthony Baez, at his
widow’s request, after Baez died in police custody); Sperm Taken from Another Dead Man,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 25, 1995, at A5 (reporting sperm harvested at widows’ request from a 34year-old man killed in a car accident). See generally Live Sperm, Dead Bodies, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan. – Feb. 1990, at 33 (Commentaries by Cappy Miles Rothman and Judith
Wilson Ross).
196

Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation,
75 N.C.L. REV. 901, 953 (1997).
197

Schiff, supra note 196, at 953.

198

Djalleta, supra note 2, at 363.
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property. However, this can easily be addressed by setting a specific time limit
allowing for the posthumous use of the frozen gamete and subsequent birth of a
heir.199 The situation requires a different analysis if the decedent passes the sperm to
his wife or significant other, but does not expressly state that he would like to have a
posthumous child nor does he provide for the financial stability of the child through
his will or estate. This raises the issues of whether the law of wills should govern or
if intestate succession should provide for the posthumously conceived child.200
B. Pretermission Considerations
Even the unintentional omission can result in a child having a right to share in an
estate through pretermission statutes.201 These pretermission statutes are designed to
protect a child who has been “left out” of a decedent’s will typically when a decedent
“forgets” to amend his will after having additional children. The Uniform Probate
Code addresses this situation in Section 2-302, Omitted Children202 providing a share
to the pretermitted child unless “it appears from the will that the omission was
intentional.”203 The Ohio Probate Code addresses pretermitted heirs in Section
2107.34 which is similar to the Uniform Probate Code.204

199
Recommendations for accommodating both the grantors and state’s interests will be
made infra.
200

Chester, supra note 191, at 983-84.

201

Guzman, supra note 6, at 219.

202

Uniform Probate Code Section 2-302 Omitted Children states in pertinent parts:
Except as provided in subsection (b), if a testator fails to provide in his [or her]
will for any of his [or her] children born or adopted after the execution of the will, the
omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate as follows:
If the testator had no child living when he [or she] executed the will, an omitted
after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate equal in value to that
which the child would have received had the testator died intestate…
If the testator had one or more children living when he [or she] executed the
will, and the will devised property or an interest in property to one or more of the
then-living children, an omitted after-born or after-adopted child is entitled to share in
the testator’s estate as follows…
Neither subsection (a)(1) nor subsection (a)(2) applies if:
it appears from the will that the omission was intentional; or
the testator provided for the omitted after-born or after-adopted child by transfer
outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by the testator’s statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence.
203

Unif. Probate Code § 2-302(b)(1).

204

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (1998) in pertinent part states:
If, after making a last will and testament, a testator has a child born alive, or
adopts a child, or designates an heir in the manner provided by section 2105.15 of the
Revised Code, or if a child or designated heir who is absent and reported to be dead
. . . the will shall not be revoked; but unless it appears in such will that it was the
intention of the testator to disinherit such pretermitted child or heir, the devises and
legacies granted by such will, except those to a surviving spouse, shall be abated
proportionately. . . .
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A posthumous child complicates the pretermitted statute situation. Technically,
all afterborn children, including posthumous children, should be covered by the
pretermission statutes, the purpose of the pretermission statute is to presume the
deceased’s intent regarding his living children by presupposing that these children
were overlooked rather than intentionally excluded.205 It is presumed that the testator
would want to provide for his posthumous child.206 The simple fact that the testator
had his sperm frozen could possibly be seen as an indication of intent and knowledge
that a posthumous child was a potential and should receive a share from the estate.207
Although there has not been any test of the posthumous child and the pretermitted
child statute in Ohio, the best course of action for a court would be to apply the
statutory assumption that the testator intended for all afterborn children to be
included in the testator’s will unless other clear indications of contrary intent can be
established.208 Thus, even a posthumous child that does not meet the afterborn
requirements should be recognized by the court within a reasonable time after the
decedent’s death.
C. Implications of the Rule Against Perpetuities
The Rule Against Perpetuities, “Rule,” operates with the intent to stabilize title
and prevent excessive dead-hand control over property by invalidating any property
interest capable of vesting more than twenty-one years after some life in being at its
creation.209 The original purpose of the Rule was to further the alienability of land
and limit the length of time questions can go unanswered.210 When the drafters of
this rule created it to limit dead-hand control, they were not contemplating the
implications of assisted reproduction or posthumous children. Indeed, the “Fertile
Octogerarian” is quite possible now. The “Fertile Octogenarian” presumed the
impossible, that a woman past childbearing age, or even having had a hysterectomy
could reproduce.211 Assisted reproduction may almost guarantee the possible
violation of the Rule, as the mere chance of something going wrong is enough to
invalidate an interest.212 For example, if a man stores his sperm, the potential for
reproduction with his gametes would neither end when he died, nor within twentyThough measured by sections 2105.01 to 2105.21, inclusive, of the Revised
Code, the share taken by a pretermitted child or heir shall be considered as a testate
succession.
205

Bailey, supra note 1, at 793.

206

Bailey, supra note 1, at 793.

207

Bailey, supra note 1, at 793.

208

Bailey, supra note 1, at 795.

209

Guzman, supra note 6, at 219.

210

The Rule looks forward and considers what may happen at the time of the creation of
the bequest. It applies to bequests containing contingent remainders and vested subject to
open interests.
211

Guzman, supra note 6, at 219 n.89.

212

See, e.g., Melita Marie Garza, After Lying to Get into an Invitro Fertilization Program,
63 year old has a baby, CHI. TRIB., April 24, 1997, at 11 (describing how 63 year old woman
had a baby after in vitro fertilization).
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one years of any validating life. As the length of time a frozen sperm can remain
viable may not be limited, the Rule may be violated whenever frozen gametes could
have implications on a class gift.213
The Uniform Probate Code takes into consideration children born long after a
testator’s death by stating, “[i]n determining whether a nonvested property interest or
a power of appointment is valid [under the Rule Against Perpetuities], the possibility
that a child will be born to an individual after the individual’s death is
disregarded.”214 A second requirement placed under the Uniform Probate Code is
that it must vest or terminate within ninety years after its creation.215 Thus, the gift
would be presumptively valid if it met these two requirements.
Many states are changing the Rule to consider actual versus possible events.
Two types of reform are now being applied to more closely align with the testator’s
intent. The cypres doctrine reforms a document to make the bequests conform to the
Rule if the testator’s intent can be protected.216 In addition, the wait and see statute
considers the validity of interests based on actual, rather than hypothetically possible
events to sustain interests that actually do vest.217 The Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities considers both techniques for reform and is being adopted by
various states.218
Specifically considering Ohio, Section 2131.01 of the Ohio Revised Code
considers the statute against perpetuities. However, Ohio has also adopted some
reform of the original common law through the elimination of the possibilities test.219
With extreme posthumous children, the Rule still may be violated. Additional
legislation would be necessary to encourage the testamentary recognition of the
posthumous child.
While it is important to consider the Rule, it is not grounds to require prohibition
of testamentary transfers of gametes. Drafters have already developed a means of
circumventing the Rule through the use of savings clauses.220 Properly drafted, these
clauses protect the distributions of the testator from the possibility that the Rule will
invalidate some bequests and return the property to the grantor’s estate to be
redistributed.221 Another possibility is to update the Rule taking into consideration
213

Guzman, supra note 6, at 221.

214

Unif. Probate Code § 2-901(d).

215

§ 2-901(a)(2).

216

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222 n.96.

217

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222 n.96.

218

The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities is contained in the UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-901-906.
219
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C) (Supp. 1999) states:
Any interest in real or personal property that would violate the rule against
perpetuities, under division (A) of this section, shall be reformed, within the limits of
the rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest. In
determining whether an interest would violate the rule and in reforming an interest, the
period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible events.
220

ANDERSEN, ET. AL., supra note 32, at 402.

221

ANDERSEN, ET. AL., supra note 32, at 402.
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the technology of today. For example, a limited window of opportunity could be
allowed, such as two years, for frozen sperm to be used. With this solution, a
testator’s intent can be preserved, and a child conceived within a reasonable time
after death could take inheritance either contingently or as a pretermitted child.
D. Intestate Distribution Implications
If a person dies without a valid will or if it contains an incomplete disposition,
the laws of intestate succession will govern what happens to that person’s property.
Each state has its own intestate succession, or descent and distribution, statues.
These statutes help identify interested persons, generally people related to the
decedent, who will be able to take from the estate. These statutes attempt to identify
who the grantor would have wanted to take the property if they had executed a will.
Since intestate statues are designed to follow a traditional donative intent, they are
inherently broad and not developed to take into consideration the implications of
artificial insemination.222
Although details of intestacy statutes vary, they share a number of basic
premises. First, a surviving spouse is the preferred taker who may share with the
decedent’s parents or children.223 Second, if the decedent did not have a surviving
spouse, surviving children or other issue take through representation.224 Third, if
there is not a spouse nor issue, the decedent’s ancestors or collateral heirs are next in
line.225 If none of the above exist, the estate will escheat to the state.226 The Uniform
Probate Code details a similar descent and distribution scheme.227 Ohio’s Statute of
descent and distribution follows a similar approach.228
222

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222.

223

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222-23.

224

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222-23.

225

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222-23.

226

Guzman, supra note 6, at 222-23.

227

Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-102 to 103.

228

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (1998).
When a person dies intestate having title or right to any personal property, or to
any real estate or inheritance in this state, the personal property shall be distributed,
and the real estate or inheritance shall descend and pass in parcenary, except as
otherwise provided by law, in the following course:
(A) If there is no surviving spouse, to the children of the intestate or their lineal
descendants, per stirpes [per representation];
(B) If there is a spouse and one child or his lineal descendants surviving, the first
sixty thousand dollars if the spouse is the natural or adoptive parent of the child, or the
first twenty thousand dollars if the spouse is not the natural or adoptive parent of the
child, plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate in the spouse and the
remainder to the child or his lineal descendants, per stirpes;
(C) If there is a spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants
surviving, the first sixty thousand dollars if the spouse is the natural or adoptive parent
of one of the children, or the first twenty thousand dollars if the spouse is the natural
or adoptive parent of none of the children, plus one-third of the balance of the intestate
estate to the spouse and the remainder to the children equally, or to the lineal
descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes;
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To take under intestate statutes, the heir must be alive and must survive the
decedent. Three conventional schemes exist to determine a state intestacy law’s
recognition of a posthumous child.229 They are as follows:230(1) If a child is
conceived or begotten before the decedent’s death, they inherit as if born alive
during the decedent’s life; (2) Posthumous children inherit just like any of the
decedent’s children born before decedent’s death; and (3) Children in gestation are
treated as if living at decedent’s death or upon surviving 120 hours after birth. The
Uniform Probate Code has taken the third approach in stating that a child conceived
before decedent’s death, but born thereafter inherits as if born during the life of the
decedent.231 Ohio follows scheme number one under Ohio Revised Code
§ 1205.14.232
Although these statutes sound deceptively simple, semantics and definitions
become imperative to the interpretation of these statutes. Presuming they believed
certain words are self-explanatory, frequently the drafters of these statutes did not
provide definitions of terms such as child. This highlights the questions as to the
proper definitions of child, parent, issue, decedent, begotton, gestation, life or death.
The term “issue” normally means the decedent’s descendants of any generation,
whether biological or adopted.233 Parent and child are two other difficult terms to
define. The Uniform Probate Code has attempted to define child and parent to

(D) If there are no children or their lineal descendants, then the whole to the
surviving spouse;
(E) If there is no spouse and no children or their lineal descendants, to the
parents of the intestate equally, or to the surviving parent;
(F) If there is no spouse, no children or their lineal descendants, and no parent
surviving, to the brothers and sisters, whether of the whole or of the half blood of the
intestate, or their lineal descendants, per stirpes;
(G) If there are no brothers or sisters or their lineal descendants, one half to the
paternal grandparents of the intestate equally, or to the survivor of them, and one half
to the maternal grandparents of the intestate equally, or to the survivor of them;
(H) If there is no paternal grandparent or no maternal grandparent, one half to
the lineal descendants of the deceased grandparents, per stirpes; if there are no such
lineal descendants, then to the surviving grandparents or their lineal descendants, per
stirpes; there are no surviving grandparents or their lineal descendants, then to the next
of kin of the intestate, provided there shall be no representation among such next of
kin;
(I) If there are no next of kin, to stepchildren or their lineal descendants, per
stirpes;
(J) If there are no stepchildren or their lineal descendants, escheat to the state.
229

Guzman, supra note 6, at 224-25.

230

Guzman, supra note 6, at 224-25.

231

Unif. Probate Code § 2-108.

232

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (1998).
Descendants of an intestate begotten before his death, but born thereafter, in all cases
will inherit as if born in the lifetime of the intestate and surviving him; but in no other
case can a person inherit unless living at the time of the death of the intestate.
233

Unif. Probate Code § 1-201(21).
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include natural and adoptive relationships but to exclude step, foster and grandparent
relationships.234
Ohio has struggled with these definitions to the point of litigation. In 1984, a
case was brought before the Court of Appeals to determine what “child” meant when
used in the state’s Statute of Descent and Distribution.235 The court held, “[t]he word
child as used in the Statute of Descent and Distribution, R.C. 2105.06, includes the
child born out-of-wedlock as well as the legitimate child if the parent-child
relationship has been established prior to death of the father pursuant to the
parameters of R.C. Chapter 3111, as effective June 29, 1983.”236 Turning to Chapter
3111 on Parentage, § 3111.01 simply defines the parent and child relationship as “the
legal relationship that exists between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive
parents and upon which those sections and any other provisions of the Revised Code
confer or impose rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.”237 Section 3111.03
provides further direction in determining presumptions of paternity.238 This section
states that genetic testing may be conducted in order to determine paternity.239 This
raises issues of how to determine paternity posthumously.
In Ohio, establishing paternity posthumously is not permitted because the
relevant statues require paternal acknowledgment or a court order during the
potential father’s life.240 In support of a similar statute, the United States Supreme
Court upheld New York’s rule that an illegitimate child can only inherit from his or
her father if a court order declaring paternity had been issued during the father’s
life.241 However, the court rulings that have considered these statutes did not involve
children who could only have been born after their father’s death. While the
Supreme Court has upheld such restrictions on proving paternity in the name of
public policy,242 they have not addressed a law that prohibits proving paternity
through DNA testing.243 Even with this precedent and Ohio’s existing statute, a
234

Unif. Probate Code § 1-201(5), (33).

235

Beck v. Jolliff, 22 Ohio App. 3d 84 (1984).

236

Id. at 85.

237

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 (1998).

238

§ 3111.03 (Supp. 1999).

239

§ 3111.03(A)(5) states that:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child under any of the following
circumstances:
...
A court or administrative body, pursuant to section 3111.09, 3111.22, or
3115.52 of the Revised Code or otherwise, has ordered that genetic tests be conducted
or the natural mother and alleged natural father voluntarily agreed to genetic testing
pursuant to former section 311.21 of the Revised Code to determine the father and
child relationship and the results of the genetic tests indicate a probability of ninetynine per cent or greater that the man is the biological father of the child.
240

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (Designation of heir at law).

241

Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978).

242

Id. at 266.

243

Bailey, supra note 1, at 785.
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probate court in Franklin County allowed the disinterment of an alleged father so that
the child could prove paternity.244 In holding that the child should have the
opportunity to prove paternity, the court stated, “Today, however, we are entering in
to a new area. Science has developed a means to irrefutably prove the identity of an
illegitimate child’s father…We live in a modern and scientific society, and the law
must keep pace with these developments.”245 Although the court’s decision dealt
with illegitimate children, it is not too difficult to foresee the court allowing
posthumous children this same method for proving paternity.
If the goal of intestate statutes is to execute the traditional grantor’s intent,
careful consideration should be given to frozen genetic material and whether most
people consider this close enough to be considered a “child.” Circumstances will
vary greatly among each genetic contributor. In the hypothetical situation discussed
at the beginning of this Article, emotional issues will also be prevalent due to the
surrounding circumstances of facing a life threatening illness. Considering this
specific fact pattern, intestacy law could presume in favor of heirship, but a different
fact pattern could yield a different result. To determine what a “typical” decedent
would want is virtually impossible in light of the widely varying motivating factors
to freeze sperm or other genetic material. Even a comprehensive empirical analysis
to determine society’s “typical” view would be too complex to be practical.
Therefore, the best method for contributors to ensure their wishes for the frozen
sperm, whether to have a posthumous child or destruction, should be expressed
explicitly at the time the material is deposited.
VII. UNIFORM CODE AND OHIO ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
Three uniform acts are frequently consulted when determining the inheritance
rights involving artificial insemination situations: The Uniform Probate Code (UPC),
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), and Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (USCACA).
A. Uniform Probate Code and Ohio Probate Code
As discussed previously in this Article, the Uniform Probate Code is relied on in
determining the inheritance rights of a child in both testate and intestate
circumstances. It’s many flaws concerning the implications for the posthumous
child have been reviewed.
B. Uniform Parentage Act and Ohio Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act was approved in 1973 at a time when state law
treated legitimate and illegitimate children differently, including their right to
intestate succession.246 The Uniform Parentage Act establishes a parent-child
relationship between a child and the natural or adoptive parents, regardless of the
marital status of the parents.247 Section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act is the only
244

Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E. 2d 1310 (1988).

245

Id. at 1314.

246

Unif. Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987).

247

Id.
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section in the Act which applies to children or reproductive technology and applies
only to children born of artificial insemination.248 However, the Uniform Parentage
Act completely ignores the existence of the posthumous child. Therefore, states that
have enacted legislation dealing with artificial insemination often inadequately deal
with the posthumous child.
Ohio has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act in Ohio Revised Code §§ 3111.30
through 3111.38.249 Unfortunately, this statute does not take into consideration the
posthumous child, as it only deals with non-spousal artificial insemination.
Therefore, the only statutory treatment of reproductive technology deals with
regulations of non-spousal artificial insemination. This very limited treatment leaves
the courts very little guidance regarding the posthumous child.
C. Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA), adopted in 1988, explains that the act “was designed primarily to effect
the security and well-being of those children born and living in our midst as a result
of assisted conception, and to give those children ‘the same rights in property and
inheritance as though conceived by natural means.’”250 Although the Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act speaks primarily to surrogacy situations, it
does address posthumous conception in Section 4, Parental Status of Donors and
Deceased Individuals.251 This section states: “An individual who dies before
implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived other than through sexual
intercourse, using the individual’s egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting
child.”252 Under section 10(b), the parent-child relationship determines intestate
succession, probate allowances and exemptions, and the child’s eligibility to take
under a class gift determined by relationship.253

248

Unif. Parentage Act 2, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987). Section 5 states:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband’s consent must be in writing and signed by him and
his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination,
and file the husband’s consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be
kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician’s failure to do so does
not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the
insemination whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a file held by the
supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the
court for good cause shown.
The donor of sperm provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
249

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30 – 3111.38 (Anderson 1999).

250

USCACA Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 162.

251

USCACA Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 162.

252

USCACA § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 162.

253

USCACA § 10(b), 9B U.L.A. 162.
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Although Ohio has not currently adopted the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, three states have adopted the Act in varying degrees.
North Dakota,254 Virginia,255 and Florida256 have all attempted to address the issues
surrounding reproductive technologies. The effectiveness of the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act has been challenged based on its limited
adoption and that it ignores the intentions of the genetic parents.257 When a sperm
donor and recipient intend to be considered the father and mother of the resulting
child, the law should support this intent.258 Instead, the Uniform Status of Children
of Assisted Conception Act has the child remaining fatherless even when this is not
the parents’ intentions.259
VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has firmly established both a right to procreate
and a right to make procreative decisions. Although the Court has not ruled upon the
constitutional protections afforded to the use of reproductive technologies, lower
courts have established a line of precedent extending constitutional protections to
cover the right to use reproductive technology to induce conception. This
constitutional right to the use of reproductive technology encompasses the use of
post-mortem insemination. However, the continued legislative inaction serves only
to complicate and confuse the dilemma as courts search for direction in statutes not
intended, nor fully equipped, to address the fact patterns which arise from assisted
reproduction.
As we look back to Bob and Cathy who started this Article, it seems that the
desire of a wife to honor her love for a recently deceased husband by producing their
child through artificial insemination is actually supporting the idea of a family. Our
laws should support this expression rather than complicate it or deem the child
fatherless. Realizing the state’s interest in prompt closure of the decedent’s estate, a
two-year limiting parameter could be set around the posthumous child. This is a
reasonable time to allow for the initial intensity of the grieving process to be
complete and the insemination procedure to be conducted. Further, the laws should
encourage the deceased father to provide for the financial welfare of his child. If his
intent is to have a child posthumously, he should make arrangements for this child to
ensure the child does not end up on societal support.
With an attempt to balance the state interests, execute the grantor’s intent, and
support the surviving spouse, the decedent should be required to explicitly express
his intent for the posthumous child and provide for support through the leaving of
property in a will or trust. A testator should be allowed to provide for the child
directly as long as it is conditioned on the two year limitation rule. If the will
contains a trust, or there is a living trust taking the place of a will, the law should
254

N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1991).

255

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 1994).

256

FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (1999).

257

Gibbons, supra note 15, at 207.

258

Gibbons, supra note 15, at 207.

259

Gibbons, supra note 15, at 207.
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facilitate the inclusion of the posthumously conceived child in class gifts and allow
direct gifts to such a child in trust, so long as the Rule Against Perpetuities is
satisfied. To accommodate the wishes of the decedent would require a number of
changes to the current Probate Code and Parentage Act. In addition, the public
would need to be educated as to the necessity of expressly stating their intentions and
providing for the potential posthumous child. However, this seems a small price to
pay when considering a child born of love from a marital union that is now left in
legal limbo and practically considered fatherless.
We have only just begun to be faced with the legal implications of the medical
technology of assisted reproduction. In this Article, we have just considered the
legitimacy and inheritance rights from the perspective of the decedent’s estate.
Consideration of the rights and obligations of other living blood relatives such as
grandparents and other siblings is an interesting issue. Even if a legislative
resolution to the immediate parental inheritance is solved, what about the next
generations. The issues are many and varied and must be addressed. Continued
legislative inaction will only serve to further complicate this already muddy area of
law to the unfair detriment of a child brought into this world by love, even after
death.
CINDY L. STEEB260
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I dedicate this Note to my late parents. I thank them . . . thank them for instilling in me
the values of hard work, perseverance, and a strong moral foundation knowing right from
wrong. It is because of the foundation my parents provided that I have been able to achieve all
the successes in my life. I thank them, too, for the wonderful, happy family memories that I
will cherish for the rest of my life as they both live on in my heart and soul. Here’s to both of
them, they have been, and will remain forever, the wind beneath my wings.
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